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A. Introduction
Last year, Congress passed the Class Action Fairness Act of
2005 (CAFA),1 a grant of federal jurisdiction for class actions.
CAFA provides parties seeking a federal forum with an alternative to
the traditional diversity-jurisdiction route. 2 Specifically, parties no
longer must establish complete diversity of citizenship, nor show that
an individual class member satisfies the amount-in-controversy
3
threshold.4  Instead, CAFA substitutes a citizenship analysis
premised on proportions of diverse citizens and an amount-in-
1. Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005) (codified in scattered sections of
28 U.S.C.).
2. See infra Part 1II.B (describing the traditional diversity-of-citizenship
analysis); infra Part III.C.1 (describing the traditional amount-in-controversy
analysis). In addition, CAFA abandons the requirements that all defendants
join in a notice of removal and are not citizens of the state from which removal
is sought. See supra Part II.
3. For convenience, this Article uses the phrase "amount in controversy"
in place of "matter in controversy." Although the latter conforms to the
statutory text and is perhaps more accurate-in that it includes injunctive
relief-the phrase "amount in controversy" remains more commonly used by
courts and commentators.
4. Cf Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S. 291 (1973) (requiring each
plaintiff to have a separate and distinct claim that satisfies the jurisdictional
amount), overruled by Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Servs., Inc., 125 S. Ct.
2611, 2615 (2005) (interpreting the supplemental jurisdiction statute to permit
jurisdiction over claims for less than the jurisdictional minimum when those
claims are supplemental to a claim that satisfies the amount in controversy);
see infra Part I11.C.1 (discussing the impact of Exxon Mobil); Clark v. Paul
Gray, Inc., 306 U.S. 583 (1939) (requiring each plaintiff to independently meet
28 U.S.C. § 1332's amount-in-controversy requirement); Strawbridge v.
Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806) (requiring complete diversity for federal
jurisdiction when a suit does not involve a federal question).
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controversy total formed by aggregating plaintiffs' claims.5 This
analysis is unfortunately not simple. CAFA's provisions contain a
seemingly "endless number of nuances and ambiguities' 6 that add
several pages to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. 7 The difficult task of defining
CAFA's metes and bounds has fallen upon federal courts. This
Article invites the reader to walk, provision by provision, into
CAFA's murky depths, to admire its many ambiguities and, where
possible, to speculate on their possible resolutions.
Before beginning this trek, consider the underlying principles of
diversity jurisdiction. Federal courts are courts of limited, not
general, jurisdiction.8 Article III of the Constitution cabins their
jurisdiction into specific categories, including cases and
controversies between citizens of different states. 9 Dubbed "minimal
diversity," this clause requires the existence of at least one party who
is diverse in citizenship from a party on the other side of the case.10
The traditional rationale for diversity jurisdiction, made famous by
Chief Justice Marshall in Bank of United States v. Deveaux,11 is to
reduce "the possible fears and apprehensions" of out-of-state litigants
that the tribunal will harbor local prejudice.
12
At issue in Deveaux was whether a Pennsylvania bank, in a suit
against citizens of Georgia, could invoke diversity jurisdiction in a
Georgia federal court.13 Historical evidence suggests that proponents
of diversity jurisdiction at the Constitutional Convention and in the
First Congress were more concerned with hostility among classes
rather than among the States. 14 Under this theory, federal courts
5. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006).
6. Anthony Rollo et al., Resorting to CAFA 's Legislative History Resolves
Some Ambiguities, CONSUMER FIN. SERVICES L. REP., Nov. 2, 2005, at 3, 3.
7. § 1332.
8. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch)
137, 173 80 (1803).
9. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
10. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 577 n.6
(2004); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
11. 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61 (1809).
12. Id. at 87; see Jerguson v. Blue Dot Inv., Inc., 659 F.2d 31, 33 (5th Cir.
1981); CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF FEDERAL
COURTS 85 86 (3d ed. 1976); John P. Frank, Historical Bases of the Federal
Judicial System, 13 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 3, 22 28 (1948).
13. Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 84-85.
14. See generally Henry J. Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity
Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483 (1928) (discussing the historic context and
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could offer a safe haven from state courts pressured by legislatures
into decisions hostile to commercial, manufacturing, and speculative
land interests. 15 Thus, no sooner had the Framers articulated a "fear
of unfair bias" rationale, than the courts imputed it to "[tihat
invisible, intangible, and artificial being, that mere legal entity, a
corporation."16
CAFA's proponents echoed these fears. Corporate defendants
complained of "judicial hellholes," where state judges and juries
were particularly unsympathetic to corporations, and hence, where
plaintiffs' lawyers sought refuge.17 By many accounts, the greatest
offender was Madison County, Illinois,' 8  where a court
acknowledged "that it applies 'kind of a loose' and 'liberal' policy in
allowing out-of-state asbestos claimants to remain in the
county[,] ... routinely refus[ing] to dismiss or transfer such cases."
19
For example, Madison County courts have been accused of allowing
reasoning behind the creation of federal diversity jurisdiction).
15. Frank, supra note 12, at 22 28; see also Felix Frankfurter, Distribution
of Judicial Power Between United States and State Courts, 13 CORNELL L.Q.
499, 520-22 (1928).
16. Deveaux, 9 U.S. at 86; cf Marshall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co., 57 U.S.
(16 How.) 314, 329 (1853) (noting that the purpose of diversity jurisdiction is
to protect distant plaintiffs from the power and influence wielded by
corporations).
17. See Victor E. Schwartz et al., Taking a Stand Against Lawlessness in
American Courts: How Trial Court Judges and Appellate Justices Can Protect
Their Courts from Becoming Judicial Hellholes, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 215,
216 (2003) ("Madison County, Illinois, is regarded as a judicial hellhole due in
large part to the fact that class actions are certified there which would not be
certified elsewhere."); AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., BRINGING JUSTICE TO
JUDICIAL HELLHOLES 2004 (2004), http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/2004/
hellholes2004.pdf.
18. The American Tort Reform Foundation (ATRF) annually selects a
group of judicial districts as "judicial hellholes," i.e., districts that
"systematically apply the law and court procedures in an unfair and unbalanced
manner, generally against defendants." AM. TORT REFORM FOUND., supra
note 17, at 4. Madison County, Illinois has topped the list for 2004 and 2003.
Sherman Joyce, Judicial Hellholes, WALL ST. J., Dec. 15, 2004, at A20.
According to ATRF, this county's problems are so cancerous that they
"worsened and metastasized" into neighboring St. Clair County, which for the
first time appears on the group's list. Id.
19. Victor E. Schwartz et al., Asbestos Litigation in Madison County,
Illinois: The Challenge Ahead, 16 WASI. U. J.L. & POL'Y 235, 245 (2004)
(quoting Transcript of Record at 16, 22, Union Carbide Corp. v. Hon. Nicholas
G. Byron (Ill. May 6, 2004) (No. 03-L-1294)).
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"claims to proceed to trial [even though] the plaintiff and defendant
[were] located out-of-state, the plaintiffs exposure occurred outside
the state, medical treatment was provided outside the state, no
witnesses live[d] in Illinois, and no evidence relate[d] to the state. '20
Admittedly, the accounts of "judicial hellholes" smack of
hyperbole. Madison County has yet to hang a sign reading
"Abandon every hope, ye that enter" above the courthouse door.21
Arguably, corporate defendants have substantial visibility within the
community that may reduce or even swing unfair bias in their
22favor. Yet, whether these corporate fears are founded is really
beside the point. In the words of Chief Justice Marshall, "[h]owever
true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer
justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every
description, it is not less true that the constitution itself.., entertains
apprehensions on this subject.
23
This Article examines whether the reprieve from "judicial
hellholes" is more purgatory than paradise. Part B addresses
CAFA's complicated diversity-of-citizenship analysis, which
involves tallying the proportions of in-state and out-of-state citizens
of a proposed plaintiff class. Part B then discusses the complicated
tests a district court must apply once the proportions of citizens have
been identified, including a six-factor balancing test and
determination of which defendants should rightfully bear the mantle
of "primary," a term CAFA does not define.
Part C describes the amount-in-controversy threshold in three
steps. First, it reviews the traditional $75,000 requirement in light of
Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services,24 a recent Supreme Court
decision involving supplemental jurisdiction. It then reviews
CAFA's new $5 million amount-in-controversy threshold and
addresses issues surrounding CAFA's aggregation of plaintiffs'
claims. Finally, Part C highlights ambiguities arising from the
amount-in-controversy calculation when plaintiffs seek injunctive,
20. Id.
21. DANTE ALIGHIERI, THE DIVINE COMEDY, INFERNO canto III, at 47
(John D. Sinclair trans., 1939) (1314) (describing the gate to Hell).
22. See J.A. Olson Co. v. City of Winona, 818 F.2d 401, 411 (5th Cir.
1987) (acknowledging the importance of a corporation's public contact with
the community).
23. Bank of U.S. v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 61, 87 (1809).
24. 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
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declaratory, or equitable relief.
B. Diversity of Citizenship
Article III of the Constitution extends the outer bounds of
permissible diversity jurisdiction to cases involving at least one party
diverse in citizenship from one opposing party.25 Since the dawn of
federal jurisdiction, however, district courts have never had broad
authority to adjudicate any case satisfying such "minimal diversity"
because the Constitution further provides that federal appellate
jurisdiction is "with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as
the Congress shall make. 26  In Strawbridge v. Curtiss,27 Chief
Justice Marshall construed § 1332's predecessor as conferring less
than the full scope of constitutionally-permissible diversity.28 Under
his interpretation, all plaintiffs must be diverse from all defendants.29
The Strawbridge decision is subject to the criticism that the statute at
issue employed language similar to Article III of the Constitution.
30
But, were the decision one of constitutional rather than statutory
interpretation, statutes like CAFA would be impermissible as
contravening complete diversity.
3 1
25. See Grupo Dataflux v. Atlas Global Group, L.P., 541 U.S. 567, 577 n.6
(2004); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967)
("Article I1I poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal
jurisdiction, founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not
co-citizens.").
26. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
27. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
28. Id. at 267.
29. See, e.g., Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 187 (1990); Owen
Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 373 (1978). In class actions,
the Supreme Court has held that only named or representative parties-not
unnamed class members-count for the purposes of determining diversity
jurisdiction. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U.S. 356, 365 (1921).
30. Compare Strawbridge, 7 U.S. at 267 ("The words of the act of
Congress are, 'where an alien is a party; or the suit is between a citizen of a
state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another state."'), with U.S.
CONST. art. 111, § 2, cl. I ("The judicial Power shall extend to all ...
Controversies... between Citizens of different States... and between a State,
or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.").
3 1. Other examples of legislation that would be impermissible include the
Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, Pub. L. No. 422, 49 Stat. 1096 (codified as
amended at 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (2006)), and the Multi-party, Multiforum, Trial
Jurisdiction Act of 2002 (MMTJA), Pub. L. No. 107-273, § 11020, 116 Stat.
1758, 1826-29 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 1369, 1391, 1441, 1697, 1785
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Before CAFA, a non-federal-question class action, even one
involving scores of citizens with numerous interstate commerce
implications, was often non-removable because complete diversity
was lacking, or the amount in controversy had not been satisfied.
Plaintiffs' counsel, seeking to preclude removal on diversity grounds,
would artfully structure their suits around the statute. For example,
plaintiffs deliberately pled damages below the jurisdictional
threshold, named non-diverse defendants who did not belong in the
action, 32 or assigned all or part of the cause of action to a citizen of
the same state as the defendant. 33 True, some protections against
these tactics exist. For example, naming defendants not realistically
subject to liability on the merits may violate Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 11.34 In practice, however, jurisdiction-defeating tactics
are generally effective.
35
(2006)).
32. Thomas A. Donovan, Proposed Class Action Legislation Will Not Do
Much to Improve a Lawyer's Image, FED. LAW., Sept. 2003, at 30, 31.
33. For cases upholding jurisdiction-defeating assignment, see Carson v.
Dunham, 121 U.S. 421, 425 26 (1887); Oakley v. Goodnow, 118 U.S. 43, 44
45 (1886); Rosecrans v. William S. Lozier, Inc., 142 F.2d 118, 124-25 (8th
Cir. 1944). For a discussion of plaintiffs' tactics to avoid federal jurisdiction,
see Joel S. Feldman et al., Consumer Fraud Act Class Actions in State Courts,
A.L.1.-A.B.A. CONTINUING LEGAL EDUC., May 2 3, 2002, at 67, 82, available
at Westlaw, SG092 ALI-ABA 67.
34. FED. R. Civ. P. 11 (authorizing sanctions for making representations to
the court that are not "warranted by existing law"). Another example is §
1359, which denies federal jurisdiction when a party has been collusively
joined to invoke federal jurisdiction. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2006). There is no
similar provision, however, barring collusive action to defeat federal
jurisdiction. See Gentle v. Lamb-Weston, Inc., 302 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Me.
1969); Leshem v. Cont'l Am. Life Ins. Co., 219 F. Supp. 504, 506 (S.D.N.Y.
1963); Lisenby v. Patz, 130 F. Supp. 670, 675 (E.D.S.C. 1955). When
analyzing diversity problems, district courts only ignore a party as
"fraudulently joined" when the removing defendant can show that "there is
absolutely no possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause of
action against the in-state defendant." Rodriguez v. Sabatino, 120 F.3d 589,
591 (5th Cir. 1997). Despite the lack of statutory support, courts have been
willing, in some situations, to "pierce the pleadings" to determine if defendants
are artificially joined to defeat diversity. Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R. Co., 385
F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2004) ("The Supreme Court thus made clear that the
burden on the removing party is to prove that the joinder of the in-state parties
was improper that is, to show that sham defendants were added to defeat
jurisdiction.").
35. Leshem, 219 F. Supp. at 504. CAFA introduces a form of prohibition
on collusive joinder to defeat jurisdiction by including as a factor, "whether the
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CAFA introduces a new diversity puzzle. It explicitly grants
federal jurisdiction over class actions when there is minimal
diversity, one-hundred or more proposed plaintiffs, and more than $5
million in controversy. 36 It requires courts to count the number of
plaintiffs from the forum state and then to determine whether that
number is one-third or less (§ 1332(d)(2)), between one-third and
two-thirds (§ 1332(d)(3)), or greater than or equal to two-thirds (§
1332(d)(4)) of the entire class. Based on these compositions, the
court must exercise jurisdiction, apply a discretionary abstention test,
or remand accordingly.
37
1. A Sense of Proportion:
The Battle of the Citizenship "Body Count"
CAFA's command to determine the citizenship of the entire
proposed plaintiff class 38 raises the question of whether the
individual citizenship analysis can truly be applied on a mass scale.
CAFA rejects the common law rule that only named parties are
considered for diversity purposes, 39 in favor of examining members
of "all proposed plaintiff classes." 40  As one commentator
forewarned, class action lawsuits could become "totally unworkable
in a diversity case if the citizenship of all members of the class, many
of them unknown, had to be considered."
4 1
a. Mechanics of the citizenship analysis
CAFA's drafters did not intend to alter the tests for determining
class action has been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal
jurisdiction." 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(c) (2006); see infra Part III.B.2.a.ii
(analyzing CAFA's six-factor balancing test).
36. § 1332(d)(2); see infra Part JI1.C (discussing the amount in controversy
requirement).
37. § 1332(d)(2)-(4). In addition to the plaintiff-class composition, the
latter two results, governed by sections 1332(d)(3) and 1332(d)(4), require the
court to find additional conditions met before remanding. See infra Part
III.B.2.
38. See § 1332(d)(3)-(4).
39. Devlin v. Scardelletti, 536 U.S. 1, 10 (2002) (explaining that unnamed
class members are not parties for purposes of determining diversity
jurisdiction).
40. § 1332(d)(3)-(4) (emphasis added).
41. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 72, at 521 (5th
ed. 1994).
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citizenship.42 The actual operation of the statute may nonetheless
have that effect. To understand how, consider the basic elements of
traditional citizenship analysis for an individual: to be a citizen of a
state, a natural person must be both a citizen of the United States and
a domiciliary of that state.43 Domicile generally requires physical
presence, coupled with intent to make the state a home.44  To
determine domicile, a court examines "the entire course of a person's
conduct," mindful that "[n]o single factor is of overriding
importance." 45  Such factors include "the place where civil and
political rights are exercised, taxes paid, real and personal property
(such as furniture and automobiles) located, driver's and other
licenses obtained, bank accounts maintained, location of club and
church membership, and places of business or employment.,
46
Although it does not purport to alter this test, CAFA may
substantially lower the evidentiary requirements for establishing
citizenship, as a practical matter. Because CAFA requires courts to
determine the entire proposed plaintiff class' citizenship, rather than
a single individual who may defeat diversity, maintaining the pre-
CAFA standard of examination would require an overwhelming
increase in workload. One tool that could possibly reduce this
mountainous workload would be to employ customer address lists.
At best, however, such lists tend to identify the residence rather than
the domicile of customers, and it is a party's domicile that controls
citizenship.
47
42. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 36 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
34. "For purposes of the citizenship element of this analysis, [Section 1332(d)]
does not alter current law." 151 CONG. REC. H723, 729 (daily ed. Feb. 17,
2005) (statement of Rep. Sensenbrenner). One exception is the treatment of
unincorporated associations under § 1332(d)(10), which defines an
unincorporated association as a citizen of the state where it has its principal
place of business and the state where it is organized. See infra Part II1.B. L.c.
43. Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 826, 828 (1989);
Kantor v. Wellesley Galleries, Ltd., 704 F.2d 1088, 1090 (9th Cir. 1983).
44. Palazzo v. Corio, 232 F.3d 38, 42 (2d Cir. 2000).
45. Duff v. Beaty, 804 F. Supp. 332, 335 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
46. Lundquist v. Precision Valley Aviation, Inc., 946 F.2d 8, 11-12 (1st
Cir. 1991) (citing 1 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE
0.74[3.-3], at 788 (2d ed. 1991)).
47. See Mantin v. Broad. Music, Inc., 244 F.2d 204, 206 (9th Cir. 1957)
(holding that diversity jurisdiction was not properly plead where the plaintiff
only alleged the defendant's state of residency without also alleging his state of
citizenship); Jeffcott v. Donovan, 135 F.2d 213, 214 (9th Cir. 1943) (holding
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In Schwartz v. Comcast Corp., 48 an action arising out of
allegedly intermittent internet service, the court allowed the plaintiff
to engage in limited discovery to establish the citizenship of various
members of the proposed class.4 9  The court conceded that the
plaintiffs' first amended complaint, filed subsequent to defendants'
notice of removal, would establish that greater than two-thirds of the
proposed class members were Pennsylvanians.5 0  The court held,
however, that class composition must be evaluated "on the basis of
the record as it stands at the time the petition for removal is filed.
'
,
51
In the original complaint, the plaintiff class had not been restricted to
citizens of the forum, but simply "persons and entities residing or
52doing business" in that state. The court rejected the plaintiffs'
argument that the term "residing" was intended as a substitute for
"citizens of.''53 Noting that the defendant Comcast had control over
information that would establish class members' citizenship, the
court ordered Comcast to provide interrogatory responses, which
included: the number of subscribers within the forum receiving
service from Comcast; the number whose billing address matched
the address where service was provided; and the number whose
billing address did not match the address where service was
provided.54
that the plaintiffs allegation of the defendant's state of residency was
insufficient to support diversity jurisdiction because "a resident of any one
state in point of fact may be a citizen of that or any other state").
48. No. Civ.A. 05-2340, 2005 WL 1799414 (E.D. Pa. July 28, 2005).
49. Id. at *7.
50. Schwartz defined the plaintiff class as "[a]ll persons and entities who
are citizens of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, who resided or did
business in the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, and who subscribed to
Comcast's high-speed internet system for service in Pennsylvania." Id. at * 1.
5 1. Id. at *3 (citing Westmoreland Hosp. Ass'n v. Blue Cross of W. Pa.,
605 F.2d 119, 123 (3d Cir. 1979)); see also Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S.
534, 537 (1939) (holding that amount in controversy is determined based on
the plaintiffs complaint at the time the notice of removal is filed); Angus v.
Shiley Inc., 989 F.2d 142, 145 (3d Cir. 1993) (holding that a plaintiff could not
destroy federal jurisdiction by amending a complaint that initially satisfied the
amount-in-controversy requirement).
52. Schwartz, 2005 WL 1799414, at *3.
53. Id. ("Hypothetically speaking, there may be numerous members of the
proposed class who are citizens of different states but who resided or did
business in Pennsylvania.").
54. Id. at *7.
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b. Lessons learnedfrom class notice
As a statistical matter, parties seeking to demonstrate the general
proportion of a class need not prove the citizenship of every member
of the class. For example, a party who has shown that 100 of 150
plaintiffs are not citizens of the forum need not identify the
citizenship of the remaining 50 plaintiffs to demonstrate that the
class falls within the lower third of § 1332(d)(2). Similarly, when a
party has demonstrated to a statistically-significant degree that a
proposed class falls within a particular third, a court need not require
additional proof. For example, where a plaintiff demonstrates that
out of 150 total class members, 80 of 100 randomly-drawn plaintiffs
are not citizens of the forum, the probability that at least 20 of the
remaining 50 plaintiffs are also not forum citizens is greater than
99.99%,
55 and a court could fairly conclude that the class falls within
the lower third of § 1332(d)(2).56 This example also applies to
corresponding multiples such as 800 of 1,000 randomly-drawn
plaintiffs from a total class of 1,500 plaintiffs.
These hypothetical scenarios represent uncontroversial, easy
cases. Suppose instead that the statistical certainty is seventy
55.
n: 5C
x: 2C
p 0.8(
-x!-(n - x)!
f 5.834 10 10
f(y) .- n! pTY.(l - p)n-y
y!.(n - y)!
50
F : f(y)
y = 20
F 0.999999999890
56. To put it differently than the preceding footnote, "you don't have to eat
the whole ox to know the hide is tough." This adage, often attributed to
Samuel Johnson, e.g., JOHiN W. STRONG, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 208
(5th ed. 1999), apparently does not appear in his works, letters, or
contemporary biographies. See SamuelJohnson.com, The Samuel Johnson
Sound Bite Page, Apocrypha, http://www.samueljohnson.com/apocryph.html
(last visited Mar. 31, 2006).
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percent, sixty percent, or less. Here, a court is without explicit
guidance because CAFA fails to provide the applicable standard of
proof for determining class proportions. A court might nonetheless
analogize the situation to traditional diversity cases, where the law
requires a preponderance of the evidence standard,57 a greater-than-
fifty percent probability.58
Another question is what evidence will satisfy that standard.
Here, the difficulty of tallying citizenship resembles the problem of
providing notice to unknown class members. In such circumstances,
courts often turn to communications experts to provide courts with
demographic data.59  For example, in In re Domestic Air Trans-
portation Antirust Litigation, a district court examined whether
newspaper advertisements would provide adequate notice to the
class. 61 The court turned to a media expert to provide statistics on
the newspapers' readership and concluded that publication provided
"the only notice program suitable for this unique and massive
consumer class action."
62
Commentators have already argued that CAFA will increase the
use of media experts and market research data to reveal class
composition. 63 Advertising and media firms have long relied on
57. 13B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND
PROCEDURE § 3611, at 521 n.34 (2d ed. 1984).
58. See Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension
Trust for S. Cal., 508 U.S. 602, 622 (1993) ("The burden of showing
something by a 'preponderance of the evidence,' ... simply requires the trier
of fact to believe that the existence of a fact is more probable than its
nonexistence." (internal quotations omitted)).
59. See, e.g., Hospitality Mgmt. Assocs., Inc. v. Shell Oil Co., 591 S.E.2d
611, 619-21 (S.C. 2004) (finding that notice requirements had been met
through the use of demographic data provided by communications experts);
Cox v. Shell Oil, Civ. A. No. 18844, 1995 WL 775363, at *6-8 (Tenn. Ch.
Nov. 17, 1995) (finding that the use of an experienced class action notice
consultant led to a notice program of "unprecedented reach, scope, and
effectiveness"). See generally Todd B. Hilsee et al., Do You Really Want Me
to Know My Rights? The Ethics Behind Due Process in Class Action Notice Is
More Than Just Plain Language: A Desire to Actually Inform, 18 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1359, 1374 ("This type of expert analyses provides valuable
information that courts need in order to determine whether absent class
members will be afforded due process.").
60. 141 F.R.D. 534, 548 (N.D. Ga. 1992).
61. Id.
62. Id. at 555.
63. See Gina M. Intrepido, Notice Expertise May Help Resolve CAFA
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such data, but some question its adequacy for determining federal
jurisdiction. 64 One approach that may allay these fears is for courts
to vary the degree of scrutiny for citizenship analysis based on how
squarely the class falls within a proportional bracket. For example, if
preliminary marketing data, corroborated by customer-address lists,
suggests that a proposed plaintiff class is comprised of roughly fifty
percent forum-state citizens, the court's confidence that the class
falls within the two-thirds to three-thirds bracket can be relatively
high. On the other hand, if marketing data suggests that the proposed
plaintiff class is near the border between thirds, a court may require
additional proof and apply closer scrutiny. In a sense, this situation
requires a "counting of chads." 65 Also, CAFA's text suggests that a
court must determine class composition before it applies the middle-
third discretionary abstention test.66  Under this new approach, a
court in a borderline situation might first balance the factors of §
1332(d)(3)(C) to determine whether, if the class fell in the middle
third, it should exercise jurisdiction. 67 In such a case, the precise
side of the balance may be irrelevant.
c. Impact of§ 1332(d) (1 0) on unincorporated associations
Prior to CAFA, unincorporated associations were deemed
citizens of the states of their members.68 Corporations, by contrast,
Removal Issues, 6 CLASS ACTION LITIG. REP. 759 (2005).
64. See generally Peggy J. Kreshel et al., How Leading Advertising
Agencies Perceive Effective Reach and Frequency, 14 J. ADVERTISING 32
(1985) (reporting on a study examining the use and effects of effective reach
and advertising frequency on media planning by leading advertising agencies);
Peter B. Turk, Effective Frequency Report: Its Use and Evaluation by Major
Agency Media Department Executives, 28 J. ADVERTISTNG RES. 55 (1988)
(reporting on a survey examining the status of effective frequency advertising
and its contribution to media planning).
65. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98, 105 (2000) (discussing the Florida
Supreme Court's order that the intent of voters in the 2000 presidential election
be determined by manually recounting chads-pieces of the ballot cards
designed to be perforated by a stylus but which, either through error or
deliberate omission, had not been perforated with sufficient precision for a
machine count to count them).
66. See 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2)-(3) (2006).
67. See infra Part II.B.2.a.ii (discussing CAFA's discretionary abstention
test).
68. See Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998); China
Nuclear Energy Indus. Corp. v. Arthur Andersen, LLP, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1256,
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were citizens of the states in which they were incorporated and the
states in which they had their "principal place of business."
69
Federal circuits have split on the applicable test to determine
principal place of business: (1) the "nerve center" test, which focuses
on the locus of managerial and policymaking functions of the
corporation; 70 (2) the "place of activities" test, which focuses on
production or sales activities; 71 and (3) the "total activities" test,
which incorporates elements of both.72
Under CAFA, both corporations and unincorporated
associations are deemed citizens of the states in which they are
incorporated and the states in which they have their "principal place
of business. 73  Essentially, unincorporated associations were
brought in line with the pre-CAFA rule for corporations and the rule
for corporations remained the same.74 In most cases, § 1332(d)(10)
reduces the number of states of citizenship for unincorporated
associations. While a corporation's citizenship may include at most
two fora (its incorporation state and its principal place of business),
an unincorporated association, outside the CAFA context, may have
citizenship in as many fora as there are members. By decreasing the
number of states of citizenship, CAFA increases the likelihood of
diversity jurisdiction, regardless of whether the organization is a
1257 58 (D. Colo. 1998); see also Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185,
197 (1990) (opining that arguments for the extension of the treatment of
corporations to unincorporated entities are best left to the legislature).
69. § 1332(c)(1).
70. See, e.g., Metro. Life Ins. Co. v. Estate of Cammon, 929 F.2d 1220,
1223 (7th Cir. 1991); Topp v. CompAir Inc., 814 F.2d 830, 834 (1st Cir.
1987); Scot Typewriter Co. v. Underwood Corp., 170 F. Supp. 862, 865
(S.D.N.Y. 1959).
71. See, e.g., Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547, 549 n.4 (5th Cir.
1992); Kelly v. U.S. Steel Corp., 284 F.2d 850, 854 (3d Cir. 1960).
72. Sweat Pea Marine, Ltd. v. APJ Marine, Inc., 411 F.3d 1242, 1247 (1 1th
Cir. 2005) (citing Vareka Invs., N.V. v. Am. Inv. Props., Inc., 724 F.2d 907,
910 (1 1th Cir. 1984)).
73. § 1332(c)(1).
74. Compare Cosgrove v. Bartolotta, 150 F.3d 729, 731 (7th Cir. 1998)
(holding that citizenship of an LLC for purposes of diversity jurisdiction is
determined by the citizenship of its members), and China Nuclear Energy
Indus. Corp. v. Arthur Anderson, LLP, 11 F. Supp. 2d 1256 1257 58 (D. Colo.
1998) (stating that a partnership's citizenship is determined by the state of
citizenship of its individual partners), with § 1332(d)(10) (deeming an
unincorporated association "to be a citizen of the State where it has its
principal place of business and the State under whose laws it is organized").
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plaintiff or a defendant. For plaintiffs, fewer states of citizenship
may reduce the likelihood of a two-thirds or three-thirds proportional
count, and hence, may increase the likelihood a federal court will
exercise jurisdiction under § 1332(d)(2).75 For defendants, fewer
states of citizenship may decrease the likelihood that the "primary
defendants" will be forum citizens, and hence may also increase the
likelihood a federal court will exercise jurisdiction under
§ 1332(d)(2).76
Still, there are potential situations where this change has the
opposite effect, decreasing rather than expanding federal jurisdiction.
Consider, for example, an unincorporated association whose
members are citizens of States X and Y and whose principle place of
business is State Z. Prior to CAFA, removal would have been proper
in an action filed by citizens of State Z against the unincorporated
association in a court of State Z because the unincorporated asso-
ciation would have been a citizen only of States X and Y (the states of
its members).77 Under CAFA, however, a court must deny removal
because the suit lacks diversity of citizenship: both the plaintiffs and
defendants are citizens of State Z.
7 8
One open question is whether CAFA also alters the citizenship
of unincorporated associations for non-CAFA diversity actions. By
its terms, CAFA's change to unincorporated-association citizenship
is only "[flor purposes of this subsection and section 1453." 79
Presumably, "this subsection" refers only to § 1332(d) and not more
broadly to the whole of § 1332.80 The traditional citizenship analysis
75. § 1332(d)(2) (4).
76. See id.; see also infra Part II.B.2.a.i (discussing identification of
primary defendants).
77. For convenience, this hypothetical assumes other jurisdictional matters,
such as amount in controversy, are satisfied.
78. Here, jurisdiction would be declined under the local-controversy and
home-state exceptions of § 1332(d)(4). See infra Part 111.B.2.b.
79. § 1332(d)(10) (emphasis added).
80. A more narrow reading, that "this subsection" refers specifically to §
1332(d)(10) as opposed to § 1332(d), would render it meaningless, as §
1332(d)(10) does nothing but redefine the citizenship of unincorporated
associations. A broader reading, that "this subsection" refers to the entirety of
§ 1332, is unlikely because: (1) "section" would present a more accurate term;
(2) section 1332(d)(1) defines terms for "this subsection" (e.g., "class," "class
action," "class certification order," and "class members") that have little or no
bearing on § 1332 as a whole; and (3) section 1332(c), which defines the
citizenship of corporations and does apply to § 1332(a), defines its scope as
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for unincorporated associations, however, is a matter of federal
common law, not statute. 81 CAFA's definition of unincorporated
associations, which marks the first effort by Congress to define the
citizenship of such organizations, could arguably be read as a
command to revise that approach.
8 2
2. Aftermath of the Count:
1/3 Shall, 2/3 May, 3/3 Shall Not Exercise Jurisdiction
CAFA's jurisdictional analysis begins with the question of
whether the class action satisfies the threshold requirements of
amount in controversy 83 and minimal diversity.8 4  If it does,
jurisdiction is established under § 1332(d)(2).85 Then, sections
1332(d)(3) and 1332(d)(4) either allow or mandate jurisdiction,
depending on the number of forum citizens in the proposed plaintiff
class.8 6
Before turning to the substance of these provisions, note that
they can be viewed in one of two ways: either as limitations on the
grant of jurisdiction, or as mandatory abstention doctrines. The
difference is subtle. If viewed as limitations on the grant of
jurisdiction, these provisions operate as an element of the initial
question: Does the class action meet the amount-in-controversy
requirement, satisfy minimal diversity, and avoid satisfying the
"[f]or the purposes of this section," not "subsection." § 1332(c) (emphasis
added).
81. See Carden v. Arkoma Assocs., 494 U.S. 185, 190 (1990); see also
supra Part 11.A (discussing the shift from a matter of federal common law to a
statutory matter).
82. One class action has already presented this argument. See Ann W.
Parks, Using CAFA as a Sword: Plaintiffs Hope the New Class-Action Law
Will Actually Send Them Back to State Court, DAILY REC. (Md.), Oct. 21,
2005, http://www.mddailyrecord.com/pub/5 398 law/legalnews/172894-
1.html. However, in Alsup v. 3-Day Blinds, No. Civ. 05-287-GPM, 2005 WL
2094745 (S.D. 111. 2005), the district court impliedly rejected the argument. Id.
at *3. After concluding that CAFA was inapplicable, the district court stated
that "unincorporated business entities, i.e., limited liability companies, are
treated as citizens of every state of which any partner or member is a citizen."
Id. Given the court's silence as to § 1332(d)(10), however, the possibility
remains that the court failed to take the provision into account.
83. See infra Part II1.C.2.
84. See supra Part J1J.B. 1.
85. § 1332(d)(2).
86. § 1332(d)(3)-(4).
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elements of sections 1332(d)(3) and 1332(d)(4)?87 If a court views
these provisions as mandatory abstention doctrines, however, the
analysis is bifurcated: first, whether the basic diversity requirements
are satisfied; and second, even if they are satisfied, whether these
sections create an affirmative duty to remand the case to state court.
8 8
Why should this characterization matter? After all, if a class
action satisfies the elements for remand, a court will not exercise
jurisdiction either way. The difference is procedural. If sections
1332(d)(3) and 1332(d)(4) operate as limitations on the grant of
jurisdiction, a court should consider them as part of the initial
remand motion. But, if these provisions act as abstention doctrines, a
court should consider their terms only after denying remand under
§ 1332(d)(2). Because of CAFA's lack of guidance and the sheer
complexity of these sections, the better solution is to treat these
provisions as abstention doctrines, to be pursued only when
necessary. If a case fails to satisfy the initial grant of jurisdiction
under § 1332(d)(2), the number of forum citizens in the proposed
class and other matters under sections 1332(d)(3) and 1332(d)(4)
become irrelevant.
a. Greater than one-third
but less than two-thirds: discretionary abstention
Before Congress enacted CAFA, the Task Force on Class Action
Legislation recommended that "some concerns over class action
practice could be addressed with federal legislation providing for
expanded federal court jurisdiction."8 9  The American Bar
Association approved this recommendation, but cautioned that any
such expansion should "preserve a balance between the benefits of
greater federal court jurisdiction and legitimate state court
87. The Senate Judiciary Committee Report on CAFA uses the terms
"Local controversy exception" and "Home state exception" to suggest a
limitation on the grant of authority (an exception) rather than an independent
abstention doctrine. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 28 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 28. These terms do not, however, appear in CAFA's text.
88. The phrasing of § 1332(d)(4) that "[a] district court shall decline to
exercise jurisdiction" supports this view.
89. Martha Neil, New Route for Class Actions: Proposals Raise Questions
About Whether Giving Federal Courts More Power over Cases Will Cure the
System's Ills, 89 A.B.A. J. 48, 53, 64 (2003) (discussing the conclusions of the
ABA's Task Force on Class Action Litigation).
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interests." 90
Section 1332(d)(3)(C) represents the core effort to preserve that
balance. It permits a court to decline jurisdiction when two elements
are satisfied: first, between one-third and two-thirds of all class
members must be citizens of the state in which the action was
originally filed; 91 and second, the "primary defendants" must be
citizens of the forum state.92 When these elements are met, a district
court applies a six-factor test to determine whether, "in the interests
of justice and looking at the totality of the circumstances," it should
decline jurisdiction.
93
i. Primary defendants and the Station nightclub fire
CAFA does not define the term "primary defendants." 94 The
Oxford English Dictionary defines "primary" as "[o]f the first or
highest rank or importance." 95 That suggests that among multiple
defendants, only one is "primary" because "first" and "highest"
describe singularities. But "defendants" is plural, even in the context
of the singular term "class action." 96 Thus, CAFA's plain language
suggests that among a group of defendants, some are primary and
some are not. In practice, this distinction creates further ambiguity.
To understand this ambiguity, consider the tragic facts of a pre-
CAFA case, Passa v. Derderian.97 On February 20, 2003, in the mill
town of West Warwick, Rhode Island, at a packed nightclub known
as "The Station," the rock band Great White took the stage and
ignited fireworks as part of their performance." The pyrotechnics
90. Id. at 64.
91. § 1332(d)(3).
92. Id.
93. Id.
94. See § 1332.
95. 12 OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 472 (2d ed. 1989).
96. § 1332(d)(3) ("A district court may ... decline to exercise
jurisdiction.., over a class action in which.., the primary defendants are
citizens of the State .... ." (emphasis added)).
97. 308 F. Supp. 2d 43 (D.R.I. 2004). Because this section uses Passa to
illustrate problems of primary defendant identification, the facts have been
greatly simplified.
98. Id. at 46; see also Peter Wilkinson, The Station Fire One Year Later:
Facing Government Apathy, the Survivors of the Rhode Island Club Disaster
Struggle to Regain Their Lives, ROLLING STONE, Mar. 4, 2004, at 50, available
at http://www.rollingstone.com/news/story/5940025/the-station-fire/.
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set off a fire that, within minutes, engulfed the room in flames.99 The
fire took the lives of one hundred people and injured more than two
hundred others, becoming the fourth-worst nightclub fire in
American history.'00 The victims brought suit against the surviving
band members and their management company.'01
This case sheds light on CAFA because it addressed an
analogous legal issue. Passa was the first case to qualify for federal
jurisdiction and consolidation under the Multiparty, Multiforum,
Trial Jurisdiction Act (the MMTJA). 102 The MMTJA provides for
minimal diversity jurisdiction and removal of mass-tort actions that
arise out of a single accident, occur in a discrete location, and result
in the death of at least seventy-five natural persons.1"3 Like CAFA,
the MMTJA includes an abstention provision, which requires a
federal court to remand where: "(1) the substantial majority of all
plaintiffs are citizens of a single State of which the primary
defendants are also citizens; and (2) the claims asserted will be
governed primarily by the laws of that State."' 4 Also like CAFA,
the term "'primary defendants' is not defined within the text of [the
statute].*"
10 5
If the nightclub fire case had been filed as a class action subject
to removal under CAFA, who would have been the primary
defendants-the band members, the management company, both, or
neither? The answer would lie in one of four potential definitions of
"primary defendant": (1) a defendant against whom significant relief
is sought; (2) a defendant whose alleged conduct forms a significant
99. Passa, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 46.
100. Id.
101. Id. at 47. In the actual case, plaintiffs sued over fifty defendants in an
eighty-one-count complaint. Gray v. Derderian, 365 F. Supp. 2d 218, 224
(D.R.1. 2005).
102. Multiparty, Multiforum, Trial Jurisdiction Act of 2002 (MMTJA), Pub.
L. No. 107-273, § 11,020, 116 Stat. 1758, 1826 29 (codified at 28 U.S.C. §§
1369, 1391, 1441, 1697, 1785 (2006)).
103. § 1369.
104. § 1369(b)(I)-(2) (emphasis added).
105. Passa, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 61. CAFA is the third Act in recent years to
employ the ambiguous phrase "primary defendants." For example, in 1999,
Congress passed the Y2K Act which included an abstention provision for "a
Y2K action brought as a class action if... the primary defendants are citizens
of that State." Pub. L. No. 106-37, § 15(c)(2), 113 Stat. 185, 201 (1999)
(codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 6601-17 (2006)) (emphasis added).
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basis for the claims asserted; (3) a defendant characterized by both
significant relief and significant culpable conduct (i.e., the first two
definitions combined); or (4) a defendant characterized by either
significant relief or significant culpable conduct.'
06
The first definition assigns primacy based on the relative net-
worth and solvency of the defendants. The Senate Judiciary
Committee advocated this approach, stating that it "intend[ed] that
'primary defendants' be interpreted to reach those defendants who
are the real 'targets' of the lawsuit-i.e., the defendants that would
be expected to incur most of the loss if liability is found."'107 For
example, in the case of the nightclub fire, the wealthy management
company might be deemed primary defendants and the insolvent
band members secondary defendants.' 
08
The ability to collect a judgment often plays an important role in
a plaintiffs decision to name a defendant, 10 9 but basing federal
jurisdiction on this deep-pocket approach potentially raises equal
protection concerns. In the nightclub fire case, Judge Lagueux
opined that "the measure of a particular defendant's ability to pay a
106. The language of these options comes from the local controversy
exception, § 1332(d)(4)(A), which requires that "at least I defendant is a
defendant (aa) from whom significant relief is sought by members of the
plaintiff class; (bb) whose alleged conduct forms a significant basis for the
claims asserted by the proposed plaintiff class; and (cc) who is a citizen of the
State in which the action was originally filed." 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(11)(aa)-(cc) (2006). The statute does not, by the inclusion
of these elements, provide a working definition for "primary defendant"
generally. Moreover, there are several indications that Congress did not intend
it to do so. For example, the third element, "who is a citizen of the State in
which the action was originally filed," in § 1332(d)(4)(A)(i)(11)(cc), would be
redundant as a definition in the context of § 1332(d)(3), which requires that
"primary defendants are citizens of the State in which the action was originally
filed." Moreover, the elements of the local-controversy exception, codified in
§ 1332(d)(4)(A), are set in juxtaposition to the elements of the home-state
exception of § 1332(d)(4)(B), which uses the term "primary defendants."
107. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 43 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 41.
108. These financial-status characterizations of the band members and their
management company ("wealthy" and "insolvent") are fictitious and are
included only to illustrate the application of a definition of primacy.
109. William A. Lovett, Exxon Valdez, Punitive Damages, and Tort Reform,
38 TORT TRIAL & INS. PRAC. L.J. 1071, 1097 n.95 ("Among many plaintiffs
lawyers, the hunt for 'deep pocket' targets is simply the 'bottom line' of tort
practice.").
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judgment should have no bearing" on the court's jurisdiction., 10 His
quick dismissal of this approach might have been a nod to the
Fourteenth Amendment's equal protection guarantee."' So read, his
logic runs into the stumbling block of the Supreme Court's refusal to
recognize wealth-based distinctions for equal protection purposes.112
To pass constitutional muster, the government need only
identify a rational basis for disparate treatment based on economic
class.' 3  For example, in the context of punitive damages, the
Supreme Court has stated that a jury may consider a defendant's
wealth when setting the amount of the award because wealth is
relevant and rationally related to the legitimate state interest of
penalizing egregious conduct. 114  If CAFA expands federal
jurisdiction to protect against bias, and if the defendant's wealth
plays a role in that bias, then whether wealth triggers the defendant's
primacy appears rationally related, and hence, constitutionally
permissible.
The second definition ties primacy to the defendant's alleged
conduct. This approach raises the tougher question of where to draw
the line. In other words, what conduct qualifies a defendant as
"primary"? Again, because the "defendants" in "primary
defendants" is plural, the problem cannot be resolved by simply
weighing allegations to identify the most culpable conduct among
defendants. The Passa court adopted this approach and defined the
relevant conduct as follows:
[AIll defendants sued directly in a cause of action maintain
a dominant relationship to the subject matter of the
controversy, while those parties sued under theories of
vicarious liability, or joined for purposes of indemnification
110. Passa v. Derderian, 308 F. Supp. 2d 43, 61 (D.R.I. 2004).
111. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
112. See, e.g., San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 29
(1972) ("[T]his Court has never heretofore held that wealth discrimination
alone provides an adequate basis for invoking strict scrutiny.").
113. See, e.g., id.
114. See TXO Prod. Corp. v. Alliance Res. Corp., 509 U.S. 443, 492 (1993)
(O'Connor, J., dissenting) ("As a historical matter, the wealth of the
perpetrator long has been thought relevant."); Browning-Ferris Indus. of Vt.,
Inc. v. Kelco Disposal, Inc., 492 U.S. 257, 300 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part) (citing Blackstone's Commentaries
and the Magna Carta).
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or contribution, maintain an indirect or "secondary"
relationship to the litigation. Thus... the most appropriate
definition of "primary defendants".... must include those
parties facing direct liability in the instant litigation. 
1 15
The band members whose negligence started the fire would be
primary, whereas the management company, sued under a theory of
vicarious liability, would be secondary.1 '6 This assignment has the
attractive feature of consolidating two uses of the term "primary" in
tort law: (1) vicarious liability 117 and (2) indemnification and
contribution.1 8  However, it also suffers from a degree of
arbitrariness because the primary and secondary divisions are cherry-
picked from the available nomenclatures of tort law. 1 9 For example,
in securities fraud litigation, courts distinguish parties alleged to have
improperly purchased and sold securities (primary) from those who
have only a "legally cognizable relationship" to the plaintiff
(secondary).1 20  Likewise, in RICO claims, courts distinguish
between defendants who participated in the racketeering activity
(primary) and defendants who aided and abetted (secondary).121
In the CAFA context, at least one district court has denoted
primary based on defendants' alleged conduct, rather than wealth or
solvency. In Adams v. Federal Materials Co, Inc. 122 a district court
was confronted with whether a party joined by a defendant for
115. Passa, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 62-63.
116. Again, this description of the theories of liability is fictitious and
illustrative only.
117. See, e.g., Halberstam v. Welch, 705 F.2d 472, 476 (D.C. Cir. 1983)
(describing secondary defendants as those vicariously liable).
118. See, e.g., Sims v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 520 F.2d 556, 559 (6th
Cir. 1975) (using the terms "primary defendant" and "secondary defendant" in
the context of indemnification); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 886B
cmt. c (1979) (describing the terms "primary" and "secondary" responsibility
in the context of indemnification).
119. In arriving at its definition for "primary," the Passa court noted other
uses of the term. Passa, 308 F. Supp. 2d at 62.
120. E.g., Marrero v. Banco di Roma, 487 F. Supp. 568, 572 (E.D. La. 1980)
(citing Woodward v. Metro Bank of Dallas, 522 F.2d 84, 94 (5th Cir. 1975)).
121. E.g., Rolo v. City Investing Co. Liquidating Trust, 155 F.3d 644, 650
(3d Cir. 1998) ("The defendants must also be divided into two additional
categories, the primary and secondary defendants.").
122. No. CIV. A. 5:05CV-90-R, 2005 WL 1862378 (W.D. Ky. July 28,
2005).
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indemnity purposes, Rogers Group, was a primary defendant. 123 The
plaintiffs argued the direct-liability theory of primacy, under which,
according to the plaintiffs, the joined party should be deemed
secondary. 124 The court concluded that Rogers Group was in fact a
primary defendant, but did so without directly confronting the
definition, because the plaintiffs' amended complaint included
allegations of direct liability against all defendants, including Rogers
Group. Thus, "[iun light of the lack of a principled distinction
between the positions of [the other defendants] and Rogers Group,
and the fact that one count of Plaintiffs' complaint is directed
against... Rogers explicitly, there is simply no basis for treating
Rogers Group as a secondary defendant in this case." 125 Although
the court did not define "primary defendants," its analysis, which
focused on direct liability rather than capacity to pay a judgment,
impliedly embraced the second definition.
The third definition combines the two preceding definitions: the
defendant must be someone against whom significant relief is sought
and whose alleged conduct involves direct liability. This definition
may create a scenario where no defendant is primary. For example,
under the facts of the nightclub fire case, the insolvent band
members would fail the significant relief element, and the
management company would not be directly responsible under a
vicarious liability theory. If there are no primary defendants,
should a court nevertheless decline to exercise jurisdiction under
§ 1332(d)(3)(C)? 126 CAFA's requirement that all primary defendants
be citizens of the forum arguably assumes the existence of at least
one primary defendant. This definition hence seems impracticable.
Finally, the fourth definition renders a defendant "primary" if
either test is satisfied: significant relief or direct liability. Under the
123. Id. at *5.
124. Id. ("Plaintiffs rely upon a distinction between 'parties that are
allegedly directly liable to the plaintiffs' and 'those parties joined for purposes
of contribution or indemnification."').
125. Id.
126. The question resembles a Zen koan: "two hands clap and there is a
sound; what is the sound of one hand?" YABU KOji, THE ZEN MASTER
HAKUIN: SELECTED WRITINGS 164 (Philip B. Yampolsky trans., Columbia
Univ. Press 1971). Section 1332(d)(3)(C) permits a court to decline
jurisdiction in the interest of justice considering "whether the class action has
been pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction."
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facts of the nightclub fire case, the band members would be primary
defendants under a direct liability theory, and the management
company would also be a primary defendant under a significant relief
theory. Because there are legitimate arguments for either
interpretation of primacy, this definition presents a compelling
compromise.
ii. A six-factor balancing test
tipped in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction
Where primary defendants and greater than one-third but less
than two-thirds of proposed class members are citizens of the forum
state, a court must balance six factors set forth in § 1332(d)(3) to
determine whether it should decline jurisdiction. 127 A court must
consider each of the factors, with an eye toward "the interests of
justice" and "the totality of the circumstances." 128 At first blush,
these words sound as though they might be chiseled below lady
justice, to evoke notions of a perfect balance. Closer examination of
each factor however, raises doubts as to whether, collectively, they
form a balanced test. For instance, compare these words with a
discretionary abstention statute from the bankruptcy context, § 1334,
which instructs consideration "in the interest of justice, or in the
interest of comity with State courts or respect for State law." 
129
Perhaps CAFA's omission of the later part of this phrase was
inadvertent; surely, the totality of circumstances includes the interest
of comity with state courts.
The first of the six factors is "whether the claims asserted
involve matters of national or interstate interest."' 30  Where such
interests exist, this factor favors the exercise of jurisdiction,
reflecting CAFA's fundamental finding that "State and local courts
are... keeping cases of national importance out of Federal court."
'1 31
It also reflects Congress' desire to create a federal forum for cases
with "nationwide ramifications,' ' 32 particularly those that might
127. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3) (2006).
128. Id.
129. § 1334(c)(1) (emphasis added).
130. § 1332(d)(3)(A).
131. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(a)(4)(A), 119
Stat. 4, 5 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006)).
132. See S. REP. No. 109-14, at 36 (2005), as reprinted in 2005
U.S.C.C.A.N. 35.
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interface with federal laws, such as suits involving nationally
distributed pharmaceuticals.' 33  Because this factor omits any
reference to matters of local interest, it leans heavily in favor of
federal jurisdiction. Furthermore, any lawsuit involving more than
one hundred plaintiffs, at least a third of whom are citizens of the
forum state and at least another third of whom are citizens of a
different state, arguably involves a matter of interstate interest.
Second, a court must consider "whether the claims asserted will
be governed by laws of the State in which the action was originally
filed or by the laws of other States."'1 34 When the law governing an
action is either wholly in-state or out-of-state, this factor appears
straightforward. 135 Many states now follow modern non-territorial
approaches to choice-of-law problems, however, involving
individualized handling of each claim and issue.' 36 The result is that,
for multi-state class actions, courts often follow the doctrine of
dipeqage and apply the laws of different states in the same case.
1 37
CAFA does not specify how to apply this second factor when various
states' laws apply, but the Senate Judiciary Committee suggested that
such cases weigh in favor of federal jurisdiction because federal
133. Id.
134. § 1332(d)(3)(B).
135. Technically, no diversity cases are governed entirely by out-of-state law
because courts apply the choice-of-law rules of their own state. See Klaxon
Co. v. Stentor Elec. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487, 496 (1941) (holding that federal
courts sitting in diversity apply the choice-of-law principles of the forum
state).
136. See SYMEON C. SYMEON1DES ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS: AMERICAN,
COMPARATIVE, INTERNATIONAL 128 (1998).
137. See, e.g., In re Disaster at Detroit Metro. Airport on August 16, 1987,
750 F. Supp. 793, 795 (F.D. Mich. 1989) (applying California law to product
liability claims and Michigan law to punitive and exemplary damages claims);
In re Air Crash Disaster at Wash., D.C. on Jan. 13, 1982, 559 F. Supp. 333,
342, 351 52, 362 (D.D.C. 1983) (applying D.C. law to issues of negligence
and products liability and the choice-of-law provisions of the state of filing to
apportionment of liability among defendants); In re Air Crash Disaster at
Boston, Mass. on July 31, 1973, 399 F. Supp. 1106, 1108 (D. Mass. 1975)
(applying a Massachusetts damages limitation to actions brought in
Massachusetts, but not to actions brought in New York, New Hampshire,
Vermont, or Florida). See generally Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 124 F. Supp.
2d 46, 53-69 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (offering a mini treatise on choice-of-law
developments); Christopher G. Stevenson, Depecage." Embracing Complexity
to Solve Choice-of-Law Issues, 37 IND. L. REV. 303 (2003) (discussing the
application of dipeqage to complex litigation).
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courts have "a record of being more respectful of the laws of the
various states in the class action context."
'1 38
Third, a court must consider "whether the class action has been
pleaded in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction."'1 39 A
district court should take jurisdiction where, for example, a class has
been "gerrymandered solely to avoid federal jurisdiction by leaving
out certain potential class members or claims.' '' 40 For plaintiffs, this
factor presents a catch-22. That is, plaintiffs who artfully plead to
avoid federal jurisdiction may help create it. Yet, plaintiffs who do
not plead to avoid jurisdiction may also help create it, and a federal
court is unlikely to give much weight to their restraint. This result
departs from the well-understood maxim "that the plaintiff is the
master of the complaint," and "the plaintiff may, by eschewing
claims based on federal law, choose to have the cause heard in state
court. ,141 Moreover, the requirements for discretionary abstention
(i.e., primary defendants and greater than two-thirds of proposed
plaintiffs are citizens of the forum) are specific enough that, more
often than not, defendants will have a colorable argument that the
plaintiff has artfully pled.
The fourth consideration is "whether the action was brought in a
forum with a distinct nexus with the class members, the alleged
harm, or the defendants."'' 42 Unlike the previous three factors, this
factor gives a party seeking remand a fighting chance against the
exercise of jurisdiction. The use of "or," rather than "and," is
significant because this factor may be satisfied where one nexus
exists between: (1) the forum and the class members; (2) the forum
and the alleged harm; or (3) the forum and the defendants. By
contrast, a conjunctive "and" would require a nexus between all four
elements: the forum, plaintiffs, harm, and defendants.
Closer examination reveals that the potential for a distinct nexus
may be largely illusory. First, recall that this balancing test applies
when the primary defendants and greater than two-thirds of the
138. S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 37 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
35.
139. § 1332(d)(3)(C).
140. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 37.
141. Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 398-99 (1987).
142. § 1332(d)(3)(D).
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proposed plaintiff class are citizens of the forum state. 143 A distinct
nexus would likely require something more than citizenship of a
substantial number of the parties because to require the same (or
less) would render this factor superfluous, and, as a canon of
construction, courts should construe statutory language so as to avoid
rendering words meaningless. 144 Second, use of the term "distinct"
limits the qualifying nexuses: where a sufficiently similar nexus
exists between other forums, "the nexus is not distinct, and this
factor would in that circumstance weigh heavily in favor of the
exercise of federal jurisdiction."'
145
According to the fifth factor of the balancing test, a court should
decline jurisdiction where the proposed plaintiff class meets two
requirements: disparity and distribution. That is, the fifth factor
requires a court to consider "whether the number of citizens of the
State in which the action was originally filed in all proposed plaintiff
classes in the aggregate is substantially larger than the number of
citizens from any other State," and whether "the citizenship of the
other members of the proposed class is dispersed among a substantial
number of States."
' 146
To see how these two elements work, consider a plaintiff class
comprised of thirty-four percent citizens of the forum, thirty-three
percent citizens of a sister state, and the remaining thirty-three
percent distributed among the other forty-eight states. Here, the
number of citizens of the forum (thirty-four percent), is not
substantially larger than the sister state (thirty-three percent), and
thus, the disparity element would weigh in favor of the court's
exercise of jurisdiction. By contrast, the distribution element
specifies that the proposed plaintiff class be "dispersed among a
substantial number of States."'147 In this example, the plaintiff class
satisfies this requirement because it includes citizens of all fifty
143. § 1332(d)(3).
144. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 174 (1803) ("The subsequent part of
the section is mere surplussage, is entirely without meaning, if such is to be the
construction.... It cannot be presumed that any clause.., is intended to be
without effect; and therefore such a construction is inadmissible, unless the
words require it.").
145. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 37 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
36 (emphasis added).
146. § 1332(d)(3)(E).
147. Id.
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states.
Consider instead a situation where sixty-five percent of the
proposed plaintiffs are citizens of the forum, and the remaining
thirty-five percent are citizens of a single sister state. Now the
disparity requirement is satisfied: sixty-five percent is "substantially
larger" than thirty-five percent. But, the class fails the distribution
requirement because it involves only two states. By mandating both
disparity and distribution, this fifth consideration weighs heavily in
favor of federal jurisdiction. Yet, just how stringent compliance
must be will depend upon courts' interpretation of the term
"substantially" as it applies to both elements.
The sixth, and final, factor is "whether, during the 3-year period
preceding the filing of that class action, 1 or more other class actions
asserting the same or similar claims on behalf of the same or other
persons have been filed.' 148 In other words, when another "similar"
class action falls within the relevant time-frame, this factor weighs in
favor of the federal court's jurisdiction. The first important issue to
be resolved is the geographic scope of the "similar" actions. For
example, the court could review cases filed within the forum state,
nationally, or even globally. CAFA's purpose to provide "for
Federal court consideration of interstate cases of national
importance" suggests the scope should be national. 149 The Senate
Judiciary Committee corroborated this interpretation when it
described the reason behind this factor: "to determine whether a
matter should be subject to federal jurisdiction so that it can be
coordinated with other overlapping or parallel class actions."'
50
The question of similarity is more difficult. CAFA does not
describe whether the similarity at issue is legal, factual, or some
amalgam, nor does it describe the degree of similarity required. In
the abstract, this final factor favors the exercise of federal
jurisdiction because, from the nationwide pool of cases filed within
the previous three years, it is likely at least one "similar" case will
exist. Further, the Senate Judiciary Committee's position on the
relevant time-frame extends beyond the statutory text of a "3-year
148. § 1332(d)(3)(F).
149. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, § 2(b)(2), 119
Stat. 4, 5 (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1711 (2006)).
150. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 38.
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period preceding the filing,"'15' and urges district courts to consider
whether claims involving the "same subject have been (or are likely
to be) filed elsewhere."' 152 Under this interpretation, a court would
prefer to exercise jurisdiction over the most novel of class actions
because, assuming the case has some merit, tag-along actions will
likely follow.
In short, a close inspection of § 1332(d)(3) and its six factors
suggests that most courts applying the test will arrive at the same
conclusion-that federal jurisdiction is proper. Because of this, and
because this section involves a somewhat unrealistic comparison of
incommensurate factors, CAFA's discretionary balancing test might
more aptly be described as a laundry list of alternative grounds for
federal jurisdiction. For example, how will a federal court balance
the advantages of remanding a state law claim against CAFA's
punitive goal of denying a state forum to a plaintiff who has "pleaded
in a manner that seeks to avoid Federal jurisdiction"? 153  The
balance, as Justice Scalia has opined, "is more like judging whether a
particular line is longer than a particular rock is heavy."'
154
b. Greater than two-thirds: mandatory abstention
under the local controversy and home state exceptions
Section 1332(d)(4) presents two mandatory exceptions to federal
jurisdiction: the "local controversy" and "home state controversy"
exceptions. 155  The local-controversy exception 156 requires district
courts to decline jurisdiction when four elements are satisfied: (1)
greater than two-thirds' 57 of the members of the proposed-plaintiff
151. § 1332(d)(3)(F).
152. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 38.
153. § 1332(d)(3)(C).
154. Bendix Autolite Corp. v. Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888, 897
(1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (criticizing the majority's application of a
balancing test to the Commerce Clause). Some economists have taken the
contrary view that all ultimate values are commensurable. See, e.g., PAUL A.
SAMUELSON, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS (Harvard Univ. Press
1983) (1947).
155. See § 1332(d)(4); S. REP. NO. 109-14, at 28 (2005), as reprinted in
2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 28 (referring to the provisions as "Home State" and
"Local Controversy" exceptions).
156. See § 1332(d)(4)(A).
157. Oddly enough, whereas the home-state-controversy exception applies
when the plaintiff class is comprised of "two-thirds or more,"
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classes are citizens of the forum; (2) at least one defendant is a
defendant from whom plaintiffs seek "significant relief," whose
alleged conduct forms "a significant basis" of the claims, and who is
a citizen of the forum; (3) plaintiffs incurred the "principal injuries"
in the forum; and (4) no other class action asserting the same or
similar factual allegations has been filed against any of the
defendants within the previous three years.' 5 8 CAFA does not define
either "significant relief' or "principal injuries," and the ambiguities
these terms present will undoubtedly spawn considerable
litigation. 159
The home-state-controversy exception1 60 directs a court to
decline jurisdiction when "two-thirds or more of the members of all
proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the primary
defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was
originally filed." 161 Again, "primary defendants" is not expressly
defined.
162
C. Amount in Controversy
Section 1332(a)(1), the traditional diversity provision, grants
federal courts jurisdiction "of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of
interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States."
1 63
CAFA's new jurisdictional grant includes its own amount-in-
controversy provision, § 1332(d)(2), which applies where "the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of
interest and costs."' 64 A casual reading might yield the mistaken
§ 1332(d)(4)(B), the local-controversy exception applies only when the class is
comprised of "greater than two-thirds," § 1332(d)(4)(A).
158. § 1332(d)(4)(A).
159. See Garth T. Yearick, New Class Action Fairness Act Makes Sweeping
Changes, A.B.A. SEC. LIUG. REP., May 2005, at 1, 3 (quoting Gregory P.
Joseph, past chair of ABA Section on Litigation, who stated that CAFA "is
going to result in a lot of very carefully drafted state court class actions and a
great deal of litigation about.., what are 'principal injuries,' and what is
,significant relief.'').
160. See § 1332(d)(4)(B).
161. Id.
162. See supra Part II.B.2.a.i (discussing the first occurrence of the
ambiguous phrase "primary defendants," in § 1332(d)(3) of the statute).
163. § 1332(a)(1).
164. § 1332(d)(2).
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impression that CAFA's new amount in controversy contracts rather
than expands federal jurisdiction. After all, Congress has, over the
years, restricted diversity jurisdiction by repeatedly raising the
amount from the original $500 to the $75,000 it is today.1 65 But
CAFA alters the analysis in two fundamental ways: First, courts
must determine whether the aggregate value of plaintiffs' claims
exceeds $5 million.' 66 Second, the $75,000 figure remains intact as
an alternative amount in controversy. Because the traditional path to
diversity jurisdiction remains a viable option for some class actions,
a refresher on this rule is worthwhile.
1. Traditional Diversity:
One Plaintiff Exceeds $75,000 and the Rest Ride Her Coattails
The non-CAFA provisions of § 1332 do not specify whether
plaintiffs' claims in a class action may be aggregated to meet
$75,000, or whether each plaintiff must independently satisfy the
requirement. The Supreme Court addressed this issue first in
Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble 67 and again in Zahn v.
International Paper Co. 168 For the purposes of diversity jurisdiction,
courts may not aggregate plaintiffs' claims; rather, each plaintiff
must independently satisfy the jurisdictional amount-in-controversy
requirement. 16 9  Even if one plaintiff independently satisfies the
$75,000 threshold, a court must dismiss any plaintiff who does not
plead this amount because "one plaintiff may not ride in on another's
coattails."
' 170
165. See An Act to Establish the Judicial Courts of the United States, ch. 20,
§ 11, 1 Stat. 73, 78 (1789) (setting the original threshold at $500); Act of Mar.
3, 1887, ch. 373, § 1, 24 Stat. 552, 552 (raising the threshold to $2,000); Act of
Mar. 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24, 36 Stat. 1087, 1091 (raising the threshold to
$3,000); Act of July 25, 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-554, § 2, 72 Stat. 415, 415
(raising the threshold to $10,000); Judicial Improvements and Access to Justice
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 201(a), 102 Stat. 4642, 4646 (1988) (raising the
threshold to $50,000); Federal Courts Improvement Act of 1996, Pub. L. No.
104-3 17, § 205(a), 110 Stat. 3847, 3850 (raising the threshold to the current
level of $75,000).
166. § 1332(d)(6).
167. 255 U.S. 356 (1921).
168. 414 U.S. 291 (1973).
169. Id. at301.
170. Id. This description applies where the class action involves separate
and distinct claims only. See FED. R. CtV. P. 23. For example, in Berman v.
Narragansett Racing Association, 414 F.2d 311 (1 st Cir. 1969), cert. denied,
October 2006] 1055
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol. 39:1025
Some seventeen years after Zahn, Congress complicated the
issue with § 1367, which extends supplemental jurisdiction to claims
involving "the joinder or intervention of additional parties" to an
action that satisfies diversity requirements.' 7' Although the plain
language of the statute expands diversity jurisdiction, Congress did
not intend this effect. 172  Several circuits, reading the legislative
history, concluded that § 1367 did not overrule Zahn.' 73  Others
arrived at the opposite conclusion, basing their decisions on the
statute's text.
174
Last year, in Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services,'75 the
Supreme Court squarely addressed the issue and held that § 1367
indeed overruled Zahn.176 The Exxon Mobil decision came shortly
after CAFA's passage, but the Court, in reaching its conclusion,
nevertheless noted the following:
[T]he Class Action Fairness Act ... enacted this year, has
no bearing on our analysis of these cases. Subject to certain
limitations, the CAFA confers federal diversity jurisdiction
over class actions where the aggregate amount in
396 U.S. 1037 (1970), the plaintiffs, licensed owners of racehorses, sued
defendants, racetrack owners, for nonpayment of a share of the "breakage," the
profit taken by the racetracks as a result of the practice of rounding off
payments on winning tickets to the next lowest whole dime amount. Id. at 313.
The plaintiffs alleged damages in excess of $12 million in the aggregate, but
the claims did not exceed the amount in controversy (then $10,000) as to any
one of the 5000 to 8000 individual "pursewinners." Id. at 312 n.1.
Aggregation of claims was nonetheless permissible because the interest of the
"pursewinners" in the asserted right was "common and undivided" as to the
entire fund. Id. at 315.
171. § 1367(a).
172. See H.R. REP. No. 101-734, at 29 (1990), as reprinted in 1990
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6860, 6875 ("The section is not intended to affect the
jurisdictional requirements of 28 U.S.C. § 1332 in diversity-only class actions,
as those requirements were interpreted prior to Finley.").
173. See Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214 (3d Cir.
1999); Leonhardt v. W. Sugar Co., 160 F.3d 631 (10th Cir. 1998).
174. Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114-19 (4th Cir. 2001); Gibson v.
Chrysler Corp., 261 F.3d 927, 933-40 (9th Cir. 2001); In re Brand Name
Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d 599, 607 (7th Cir. 1997); In re
Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 529 (5th Cir. 1995), aff'dper curiam by an equally
divided Court, sub nom. Free v. Abbott Labs., Inc., 529 U.S. 333 (2000)
(leaving open the issue of whether § 1367 overrules Zahn).
175. 125 S. Ct. 2611 (2005).
176. Id. at 2615.
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controversy exceeds $5 million. It abrogates the rule
against aggregating claims, a rule this Court recognized in
Ben-Hur and reaffirmed in Zahn. The CAFA, however, is
not retroactive, and the views of the 2005 Congress are not
relevant to our interpretation of a text enacted by Congress
in 1990. The CAFA, moreover, does not moot the
significance of our interpretation of § 1367, as many
proposed exercises of supplemental jurisdiction, even in the
class-action context, might not fall within the CAFA's
ambit. 177
Thus, even after CAFA's passage, traditional diversity and
supplemental jurisdiction, as interpreted by the Court in Exxon
Mobil, are still pertinent to "many proposed" jurisdictional
exercises.
178
Where a defendant seeking removal is unable to satisfy CAFA's
requirements, federal jurisdiction is still available if the defendant
presents some evidence to establish the plausibility of an inference
that at least one member of the class has damages exceeding
$75,000.179 When a single plaintiff satisfies this requirement, the
entire class may attach under the supplemental jurisdiction statute.
1 80
Despite the Court's holding in Exxon Mobil, however, the traditional
door to diversity jurisdiction remains a narrow one.1 81  Parties
177. Id. at 2627-28 (citation omitted).
178. Id. at 2628.
179. See Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2616; Garble v. DaimlerChrysler Corp.,
211 F.3d 407, 410 (7th Cir. 2000); In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs
Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d at 607; see also Singer v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 116 F.3d 373, 375 (9th Cir. 1997) (holding that if the claim appears to be
made in good faith, then the sum claimed by the plaintiff controls for removal
purposes unless it is apparent, to a legal certainty, that the plaintiff cannot
recover the amount claimed); Boyer v. Snap-on Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108,
110 12 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1085 (1991) (imposing a heavy
burden for removing defendant to rebut the presumption that plaintiffs stated
amount in controversy controls).
180. 28 U.S.C. § 1367 (2006).
181. Exxon Mobil may have been influenced by the passage of CAFA and
perhaps marks the beginning of the softening of the Strawbridge rule. See
Transcript of Oral Argument at 24, Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. 2611 (No. 04-79)
("JUSTICE KENNEDY: Strawbridge has become less hallowed in light of the
new congressional enactment. What's it called? The Sunshine in Class
Action? What is it? MR. LONG: I didn't bring- JUSTICE GINSBURG:
Class Action Fairness Act.").
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seeking federal jurisdiction must still overcome two hurdles: they
must satisfy the Strawbridge complete diversity requirement,' 82 and
the case must involve at least one plaintiff who individually meets
the $75,000 amount-in-controversy threshold. 183  As discussed
above, CAFA abandons the Strawbridge rule in favor of minimal
diversity, and thereby eliminates the first hurdle. 184 CAFA raises the
bar on the second hurdle from $75,000 to $5 million, but the
aggregation of plaintiffs' claims offers a new means to clear it.
2. CAFA's Approach: $5 Million in
Controversy, Calculated in the Aggregate
Under CAFA, a federal court may exercise diversity jurisdiction
after it aggregates plaintiffs' claims and finds alleged damages in
excess of $5 million.1 85  This is a relatively straightforward
proposition when plaintiffs seek a federal forum because their
complaint will likely contain allegations that, if proven at trial, would
establish the amount in controversy.' 86  When plaintiffs pursue a
state forum, however, "the complaint may be silent or ambiguous on
one or more of the ingredients needed to calculate the amount in
controversy."' 87  Alternatively, plaintiffs may have set the ad
damnum clause in the complaint below the $5 million threshold (i.e.,
"seeking damages not to exceed $4,999,999").188 The relevant
inquiry is not how much the plaintiffs will recover, or are likely to
recover, but how much the plaintiffs have, by their pleadings, put "in
controversy."' 189 Where the possibility of recovery in excess of $5
182. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806); see supra Part
II1.B (discussing the diversity of citizenship requirements).
183. Exxon Mobil, 125 S. Ct. at 2635 36.
184. See supra Part III.B.
185. Section 1332(d)(6) provides: "In any class action, the claims of the
individual class members shall be aggregated to determine whether the matter
in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest
and costs."
186. Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 448-49 (7th Cir.
2005).
187. Id. at 449.
188. For a brief discussion of the ad damnum clause, see 22 AM. JUR. 2D
Damages § 653 (2005). Note that in addition to $4,999,999, damages of
precisely $5 million would still fail to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement,
because the amount in controversy must "exceed" the sum or value of $5
million. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2) (2006).
189. Brill, 427 F.3d at 448.
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million exists, CAFA's amount-in-controversy requirement is
satisfied. 190
Courts interpreting CAFA may, by analogy, apply the traditional
requirements for removal: a defendant must either demonstrate that it
is "facially apparent" that plaintiffs' claims exceed the statutory
amount, or set forth facts that support a finding of the requisite
amount. 191 Such facts may include rejected settlement offers in
excess of the requisite amount in controversy.' 92  Though a
potentially expensive tactic, plaintiffs could defeat jurisdiction by
simply praying for relief below the jurisdictional threshold. 93 Yet,
whether this approach remains viable under CAFA is unclear,
particularly because CAFA instructs judges to consider whether
plaintiffs pleaded the class action in a manner that seeks to avoid
federal jurisdiction. 1
94
One point of difference between traditional and CAFA diversity
is whether punitive damages may be added to plaintiffs' alleged
compensatory damages to meet the jurisdictional minimum. Courts
have held that although punitive damages may be added in non-class
actions, 95 they may not be aggregated for class actions, in light of
190. Id. at 449. In Brill, the plaintiff sought statutory damages of $500 per
fax for 3800 faxes sent in alleged violation of the Telephone Consumer
Protection Act, 47 U.S.C. § 227 (2006). Id. Although this would amount to
only $1.9 million in damages, the plaintiff left open the reasonable possibility
of damages in excess of $5 million, by stating in the complaint that "[i]f the
evidence shows that the violation was willful, plaintiff requests trebling of the
damages," which would amount to $5.7 million. Id.
191. Luckett v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 171 F.3d 295, 298 (5th Cir. 1999).
192. See Cohn v. Petsmart, Inc., 281 F.3d 837, 840 (9th Cir. 2002).
193. St. Paul Mercury Indem. Co. v. Red Cab Co., 303 U.S. 283, 294 (1938)
(holding that a defendant may not remove where the plaintiff has sued for less
than the jurisdictional amount); see, e.g., Seroyer v. Pfizer, Inc., 991 F. Supp.
1308, 1311 (M.D. Ala. 1997) (remanding an action in which plaintiffs' sought
relief "not to exceed $49,999.00 per plaintiff' and disavowed punitive or
equitable relief).
194. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(3)(C) (2006). This factor comes into play only
when two circumstances are met: (1) greater than one-third but less than two-
thirds of the proposed plaintiff class are citizens of the forum; and (2) the
primary defendants are citizens of the forum. § 1332(d)(3). However, in the
absence of CAFA case law, the inclusion of this factor may influence judicial
recognition of the restricted-prayer plaintiff tactic. See supra Part I1I.B.2.a.ii.
195. Bell v. Preferred Life Assurance Soc'y, 320 U.S. 238, 240 (1943)
("Where both actual and punitive damages are recoverable under a complaint
each must be considered to the extent claimed in determining jurisdictional
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the Court's prior express proscription against aggregation.' 96 Under
CAFA, however, courts should revisit this rationale because the
statute's command to aggregate damages is not, by its terms,
restricted to compensatory damages.' 97  A simple instruction to
aggregate all damages sought-whether actual or punitive-may go
a long way to simplify the analysis. Yet, it does not resolve all of
CAFA's complications because not all claims come with ready price
tags.
3. Three Views on Valuing Injunctive,
Declaratory, or Equitable Relief
Under both CAFA 198 and traditional diversity rules, 199 courts
may use the "sum or value" of individual claims to calculate the
amount in controversy. This rule raises several questions in the
context of injunctive, declaratory, or equitable relief. For example,
what if the value of injunctive relief to the plaintiff is different from
the value to the defendant? And, from a jurisdictional standpoint,
whose viewpoint controls?
Where a party seeks non-monetary relief, courts have
traditionally applied one of three valuations,20 0 based on: (1) the
plaintiffs' viewpoint;20' (2) the viewpoint of either plaintiffs or
amount."); Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Copy Plus, Inc., 939 F.2d 513, 515 (7th Cir.
1991).
196. See, e.g., Ayres v. Gen. Motors Corp., 234 F.3d 514, 517 (1 1th Cir.
2000); Lindsey v. Ala. Tel. Co., 576 F.2d 593, 594 (5th Cir. 1978) (citing
Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969) and Zahn v. Int'l Paper Co., 414 U.S.
291 (1973)).
197. § 1332(d)(6) ("[T]he claims of the individual class members shall be
aggregated to determine whether the matter in controversy exceeds ...
$5,000,000 .... ).
198. § 1332(d)(6).
199. § 1332(a).
200. See 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE §
102.109[1]-[5] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 2005); GEORGENE M. VA1RO, THE
CLASS ACTION FAIRNESS ACT OF 2005: A REVIEW AND PRELIMINARY
ANALYSIS 24-25 (Matthew Bender 2005).
201. Cowan v. Windeyer, 795 F. Supp. 535, 537 (N.D.N.Y. 1992); Kheel v.
Port of N.Y. Auth., 457 F.2d 46, 48 49 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S.
983 (1972); see McLaughlin, Piven, Vogel, Inc. v. Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers,
Inc., 733 F. Supp. 694, 698 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (declining jurisdiction because no
amount fairly flowed directly and with a fair degree of probability from the
outcome of the litigation).
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defendants; 20 2 or (3) the viewpoint of the party invoking federal
jurisdiction.2 °3  The federal circuits are split on the preferred
approach,20 4 and the Supreme Court has never resolved the issue.2 °5
Following passage of CAFA, the Senate Judiciary Committee
advocated the adoption of the either-viewpoint approach.2 °6 The
post-enactment status of the Committee's report may diminish its
interpretive value, however.20 7 Justice Scalia has characterized such
202. See In re Ford Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2001), cert.
dismissed, 537 U.S. 1 (2002).
203. See MOORE ET AL., supra note 200, § 102.109[1]-[5].
204. Some circuits have adopted the plaintiffs viewpoint. See, e.g., Packard
v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1050 (3d Cir. 1993); Kheel, 457 F.2d
at 46; Mass. State Pharm. Ass'n v. Fed. Prescription Serv. Inc., 431 F.2d 130
(8th Cir. 1970); Alfonso v. Hillsborough County Aviation Auth., 308 F.2d 724
(5th Cir. 1962). Other circuits have adopted the "either party approach." See,
e.g., UHL v. Thoroughbred Tech. & Telecomms., Inc., 309 F.3d 978, 984 (7th
Cir. 2002); Ronzio v. Denver & R.G.W.R. Co., 116 F.2d 604, 606 (10th Cir.
1940). There is also support for adopting the viewpoint of the party seeking to
invoke jurisdiction. See, e.g., Family Motor Inn, Inc. v. L-K Enters. Div.
Consol. Foods Corp., 369 F. Supp. 766 (E.D. Ky. 1973); Hatridge v. Aetna
Cas. & Surety Co., 415 F.2d 809, 815 (8th Cir. 1969). Support for the
plaintiffs viewpoint approach is principally garnered from the Supreme
Court's narrow opinion in Glenwood Light & Water Co. v. Mutual Light, Heat
& Power Co., 239 U.S. 121 (1915) ("[T]he rule applicable generally to suits
for injunction to restrain a nuisance... [is] that the jurisdictional amount is to
be tested by the value of the object to be gained by complainant." (emphasis
added)).
205. One case came close. In Mississippi & Missouri Railroad v. Ward, 67
U.S. (2 Black) 485 (1862), a steamboat owner sought the removal of a bridge,
which he alleged constituted a public nuisance. Id. at 491. The Court found
the amount-in-controversy requirement satisfied, stating that "the want of a
sufficient amount of damage having been sustained to give the Federal Courts
jurisdiction, will not defeat the remedy, as the removal of the obstruction is the
matter of controversy, and the value of the object must govern." Id. at 492.
The Court was unfortunately not clear as to what the phrase, "value of the
object," referred the value to the steamboat operator to have an unobstructed
river or the expense of tearing down the bridge.
206. S. REP. No. 109-14, at 42 (2005), as reprinted in 2005 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3,
40 ("[T]he Committee intends that a matter be subject to federal jurisdiction
under this provision if the value of the matter in litigation exceeds $5,000,000
either from the viewpoint of the plaintiff or the viewpoint of the defendant, and
regardless of the type of relief sought (e.g., damages, injunctive relief, or
declaratory relief).").
207. See United States v. Carlton, 512 U.S. 26, 39 (1994) (Scalia, J.,
concurring).
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208
"post-legislation legislative history" as an oxymoron.
To understand how these three approaches differ, consider the
following hypothetical: In a property dispute, plaintiffs seek to put a
certain tract of land to a $4 million use, while the defendant seeks an
alternative $6 million use. The plaintiffs' viewpoint would value the
amount in controversy at $4 million, below CAFA's $5 million
jurisdictional threshold. Under the either-viewpoint approach, a
court would look to the higher value, $6 million, and find the
requirement satisfied. The invoking-party approach conditions the
court's decision on whether the plaintiffs originally filed in federal
court (in which case, the amount in controversy is $4 million), or
whether the defendant removed the action from state court ($6
million).
In the past, the Supreme Court's prohibition on the aggregation
of claims added a unique wrinkle for class actions. That is, the
defendant's perspective could represent an aggregation of plaintiffs'
claims. Following this logic, some courts concluded they could not
value class actions from defendants' perspectives, and thus, they
adopted the plaintiffs' viewpoint. 20 9 CAFA's explicit command to
aggregate plaintiffs' claims would seem to negate this rationale,
210
however, leading some courts to conclude that the value of injunctive
relief under CAFA may be measured from the defendants'
perspective.2 1
208. Id.
209. See, e.g., Packard v. Provident Nat'l Bank, 994 F.2d 1039, 1050 (3d
Cir. 1993), cert. denied sub. nom. Upp v. Mellon Bank, 510 U.S. 964 (1993)
(citing Snow v. Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1977)); Snow v.
Ford Motor Co., 561 F.2d 787, 790 (9th Cir. 1977); Loizon v. SMH Societe
Suisse de Microelectronics Et Horologerie SA, 950 F. Supp. 250, 252-53
(N.D. 111. 1996) (holding that the "either viewpoint" rule did not apply to class
actions, because use of the rule would permit aggregation of claims); Shelly v.
S. Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 873 F. Supp. 613, 616 17 (M.D. Ala. 1995) (refusing
to "create a back door to the federal courthouse" by using the cost to the
defendant of plaintiffs requested injunctive relief as the basis for federal
jurisdiction); Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 863 F. Supp. 1156, 1163 (C.D.
Cal. 1993); Indianer v. Franklin Life Ins. Co., 113 F.R.D. 595, 603-04 (S.D.
Fla. 1986); ef In re Brand Name Prescription Drugs Antitrust Litig., 123 F.3d
599, 609 (7th Cir. 1997) (holding that the "either viewpoint" rule permits
assessment of defendant's cost of injunction in a class action).
210. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(6) (2006) ("[T]he claims of the individual class
members shall be aggregated . . ").
211. See Rodgers v. Cent. Locating Serv., Ltd., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1171, 1179
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CAFA disrupts other viewpoint analyses as well. For example,
in McCarty v. Amoco Pipeline Co.,212 the Seventh Circuit recognized
a problem with measuring the amount in controversy from the
viewpoint of the party invoking jurisdiction:
Under the rule, if a case originally brought in federal court
were dismissed for failure to meet the jurisdictional amount
from the plaintiff s viewpoint, it could yet end up in federal
court if the plaintiff reinstituted the case in state court and
the defendant-from whose point of view the required
amount was present-then removed it.... 28 U.S.C. §
1441 only provides for the removal of actions "of which the
district courts of the United States have original
jurisdiction ..... " Thus, it is generally true that if a case
could not originally be brought in federal court it may not
be removed there. But as outlined above, [this] rule could
lead to a situation where the federal court would assume
removal jurisdiction where it could not assert original
jurisdiction.
2 13
McCarty's rationale is compelling: if a court adopts the
invoking-party viewpoint for traditional diversity, it runs afoul of
§ 1441's original jurisdiction requirement. 2 14  This flaw may not
apply to CAFA, however, because CAFA removals are not exercised
under § 1441. Instead, defendants remove under CAFA's own
removal statute, § 1453.215 Unlike § 1441, this provision does not
require the federal court to have original jurisdiction.1 6 Thus, in
addition to providing for removal procedures, § 1453 also operates to
independently enable removal. An alternative approach reads § 1453
in pari materia with the general removal provision, § 1441. Under
(W.D. Wash. 2006) ("Under CAFA, the total relief sought by all class
members is aggregated ... [a]nd the 'value' of injunctive relief is determined
by calculating the defendant's costs of compliance .... ") (citing In re Ford
Motor Co., 264 F.3d 952, 958 (9th Cir. 2001)); Berry v. Am. Express Publ'g,
Corp., 381 F. Supp. 2d 1118 (C.D. Cal. 2005) (adopting the either-viewpoint
approach).
212. 595 F.2d 389, 393 (7th Cir. 1979).
213. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (2006)).
214. § 1441(a).
215. § 1453; see supra Part 11 (discussing removal jurisdiction under
CAFA).
216. See § 1453.
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this view, the traditional statute is the proper vehicle for class action
removal, subject to § 1453's modifications.2 17
D. Conclusion
CAFA's road is paved with ambiguous provisions. This Article
sought to delve into that ambiguity by searching the ashes of a burnt
nightclub for a workable definition of "primary defendants," probing
a six-factor scale for clues of its future tilt, and estimating the price-
tag of injunctive relief. CAFA, it is clear, heralds fundamental
changes to class action litigation. New strategies and practices
aimed at aggregation rules and proportional class citizenship will test
CAFA's contours. Like it or not, class action lawyers, once the
masters of "judicial hellholes," must now walk CAFA's winding
path to federal court. As one writer put it, "In a time of drastic
change it is the learners who inherit the future. The learned usually
find themselves equipped to live in a world that no longer exists. 218
Consider the jurisdictional world of the recent past. Just two
years ago, in the Foreword to the Developments in the Law issue of
this Law Review, Professor Georgene Vairo described legislative
efforts in the area of federal jurisdiction that, "with some important
exceptions for complex litigation, seem to be part of a continuing
trend to limit diversity jurisdiction., 21 9 Other commentators have
noticed this trend for some time. For example, in 1941, Justice
Frankfurter characterized the "dominant note" in congressional
enactments relating to diversity jurisdiction as "one of jealous
restriction. ,220 Why then did Congress buck the trend with CAFA,
an expansion of federal jurisdiction? Should it be read as a vote of
confidence in the federal judiciary or merely as distaste for the
practices of some state courts? Time will tell whether CAFA is
among the early data points in a new trend toward expanding
217. See, e.g., Things Remembered, Inc. v. Petrarca, 516 U.S. 124, 129
(1995) (holding that a bankruptcy removal statute could comfortably coexist
with the general removal provisions); see supra Part 11 (discussing removal
jurisdiction under CAFA).
218. ERIc HOFFER, REFLECTIONS ON THE HUMAN CONDITION 22 (1973).
219. Georgene Vairo, Foreward, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REv. 1393, 1400 (2004).
220. Indianapolis v. Chase Nat'l Bank, 314 U.S. 63, 76 (1941); Thomas E.
Baker, A View to the Future of Judicial Federalism: "Neither Out Far Nor In
Deep," 45 CASE W. RES. 705, 765 (1995) ("[T]he discernible modern trend
has been to limit and reduce the scope of [diversity] jurisdiction.").
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diversity jurisdiction or merely an "important exception."
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